Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis is applicable irrespective of whether the surplus exists at the start of the game or it is created after all players agree. We show that their claim is wrong. Their analysis is not applicable when the surplus is created after all players agree. Hence, some of the important real life bargaining situations, like management-multiple unions bargaining and land assembly are not in the scope of Krishna and Serrano (1996)
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining ...
We study unanimity bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constrain...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis i...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a model of multilateral bargaining...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to assemble objects owned by m...
The paper is a comment on "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout" by Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta...
In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the...
This paper proposes a noncooperative model of multilateral bargaining. The model can be viewed as an...
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general cla...
We consider multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over recognition. We find that when ...
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. Fo...
This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n ¡ 1) bilateral bargainin...
∗We thank two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions. Ed Green, George Mailath, Andy McLenn...
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to ...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining ...
We study unanimity bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constrain...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis i...
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a model of multilateral bargaining...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to assemble objects owned by m...
The paper is a comment on "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout" by Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta...
In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the...
This paper proposes a noncooperative model of multilateral bargaining. The model can be viewed as an...
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general cla...
We consider multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over recognition. We find that when ...
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. Fo...
This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n ¡ 1) bilateral bargainin...
∗We thank two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions. Ed Green, George Mailath, Andy McLenn...
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to ...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining ...
We study unanimity bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constrain...